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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

J. R. BAGNALL, aka JOSEPH R.
BAGNALL, and FLORENCE BAGNALL,
. . . Plaintiffs and
Respondents,
Case No. 13 753

vs.

SUBURBIA LAND COMPANY, an
Idaho corporation, et. a l . ,
. . . Defendants and
Counter Appellants.

REPLY BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS - APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves an action to forfeit a real estate agreement for
alleged failure to make the required installments, and to quiet title to some
570 acres of land in the plaintiffs.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
The Court denied the defendants 1 motion for judgment on the
verdict, or, in the alternative, for a new trial, and granted judgment in favor
of the plaintiffs, and against the defendants forfeiting the real estate agreement
and quieting title in the plaintiss, except for an undivided 1/2 interest in 140. 15
acres, which the Court, by Summary Judgment and Decree of Quiet Title,
awarded to United Paint and Colors.

Plaintiff's appeal from the Summary
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Judgment and D e c r e e of Quiet Title is also pending before this honorable court.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants (defendants ) seek reversal of the Judgment of
Forfeiture, and seek to have judgment entered in their favor dismissing the
complaint of the plaintiff and reinstating the contract.

Defendants further seek

an award and judgment for attorney fees and costs, and to have the matter
remanded back to the District Court for a determination of damages, adjustments
and offsets due defendants from the plaintiffs.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The statement of facts contained in defendants 1 (Suburbias 1 ) appeal
brief on file herein is incorporated by reference.

Because plaintiffs in their

so called n Editorial Note11 and !, Statement of F a c t s " contained in their brief
have called into question the integrity of defendants and their counsel; and
because they have characterized the defendants 1 Statement of Facts as "distorted 11 ,
"astounding", shocking", and "more argument that fact",

bearing "but a fleeting

similarity" to the truth, and so on ad nauseum, defendants have reprinted
herein as Appendix "A", their statement of facts as originally contained in their
appeal brief, and have added citations to the record to substantiate each statement contained therein, and the Court is referred to Appendix "A", and asked
to read it carefully.
The voluminous collection of distortions, half truths, agruments, and
outright untruths (lies?), as contained in the Bagnalls f brief, w r i t t e ^ b y their
attorney's own admission, strictly from memory, and masquerading as a
Statement of Facts, a r e , for the most part, entirely unsupported by the evidence
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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and record, and, in many cases are contradicted by the record.

Defendants

feel it necessary to present the true facts and issues in some detail.

The

correct facts with respect to some of the more important distortions contained
in the Bagnalls 1 Editorial Note and Statement of Facts are as follows:
1. Plaintiffs, in their Editorial Note, claim that they are unable
to cite the appropriate pages of the record in support of their nonsensical
version of the facts because the defendants failed to designate sufficient of the
record.

A careful review of the record will show the plaintiffs 1 position to be

palpable nonsense.

Plaintiffs, on page two of their brief set forth certain

testimony which they allege to be designated by the defendants, and certain
testimony which they claim was not designated.

It is obvious that the writer

>

of plaintiffs 1 brief did not even bother to look at defendants' designation.

Had

he done so he would have found that, in addition to the testimony which he says
was designated, defendants also designated all of the testimony of Edgar Anderson,
all of the cross examination of Don V. Tibbs, and the rebuttal testimony of J. R.
Bagnall.
Plaintiffs go on to say that defendants foiled to bring up the record
consisting of the "entire testimony of Judge Don V. Tibbs, Mildred S. Maxfield
LaVera Maxfield, Leleland Peterson, and John Brown",

They neglected to tell •

the Court that defendants had, in fact, brought up all of the cross examination of
Don Tibbs, or that LaVera Maxfield did not even testify.

The whole implication

of plaintiffs 1 editorial note is to the effect that vast portions of the testimony,
relevant to the issues to be decided by this court, are missing.

Such implication

simply is not true! In addition to the testimony designated by defendants,
certain additional testimony which was partially prepared by the reporter in
- 3 J.
- Reuben
•
• BYU.
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'

'

'

response to plaintiffs supplemental designation of the record are also before
the court.
A careful examination of notes taken at the trial by the undersigned
writer reveal that the only testimony not before the court is the direct examination
of J. R. Bagnall (every point covered in direct was carefully re-examined on
cross): the direct of Don V. Tibbs, (as with J. R, r s direct, every point
covered on direct with Mr. Tibbs was re-covered on cross): the testimony of LeLand
Peterson (who testified that he had not been an officer of Suburbia Land): the
testimony of John Brown (who testified as to the appraised value of the ranch):
and some cross of Reed Maxfieid (the Court does have 68 pages of Maxfieid r s
cross). Except for the testimony of LeLand Peterson which may have some
bearing upon the credibility of Mr. Maxfieid, none of the other ommitted
testimony has any thing to add to that actually before the Court,
2.

a

: rn-

,

Plaintiffs, in their Editorial Note have further mistated even

proceedings had before this honorable Court.
writes about things of which he knows nothing.

The writer of plaintiffs brief
He states that plaintiffs were

concerned about the status of the transcript and moved the court to compel
defendants to designate the entire record.
undoubtedly true.

That much of their statement is

Everything else they had to say about their motion and the

proceedings had thereon is untrue.

For instance, plaintiffs state that

defendants 1 counsel (the undersigned writer) stated to the court that the record
designated would sufficiently cover the disputed areas and that the court futile ref ore acquiesed in appellants' assertion that the record was adequate.
is simply not what happened.

That

The writer did say that, In his opinion, defendants

had designated ail of the record that they needed.

Mr. Ron Boutwell, who was

appearing as counsel
for the plaintiffs made reference to the case of Mitchell
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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vs. Mitchell (case no. 13565, filed November 7, 1974) in which Mr. Boutwell's
client lost for failure to designate any portion of the transcript.

After some

discussion between counsel and the court. Mr. Boutwell stated that he was
ambivalent in his position and did not wish to pursue his motion.

Based upon

his withdrawl of the motion, the court had no choice but to deny it.

Plaintiffs

then withdrew their supplemental designation of record which had designated ail
but a small portion of the testimony not previously designated by defendants:
Plaintiffs further state in their editorial note that they had a portion
of the balance of the record designated. That statement, without more, is technically
correct, but to imply that the partial transcript of additional testimony on file
with the court, and to which they make reference, was filed because they had
designated only that particular portion, is untrue.

They had designated more, but

changed their minds and withdrew the designation totally.

The partial testimony was

apparently filed because the reporter had already transcribed it before plaintiffs
changed their minds, had nothing else to do with it, and, therefore, sent it to the
court to be filed.

The Court will note that it was first sent to the clerk of this

court without the proper certification from the Sanpete County Clerk and was returned
to Sanpete for certification before it was accepted for filing.
3.

On page five of their brief, plaintiffs state that "one cannot

readily appreciate Mr. Maxfield f s demeanore and conduct without seeing him
in court and without reading the description of the transaction given by Judge
Tibbs n .

Plaintiff then quotes a portion of the cross examination of Mr. Tibbs

as contained on page 99 of the transcript.

Plaintiff fails to inform the court that

on the same page Mr. Tibbs states that his recollection is different from that
of the other parties to the transaction (Tr. Bk. 1, p. 99) or that Mr. Reed Maxfield
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library,
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testified that Mr. Tibbs was recalling not Reed Maxfield, but his father, E. R.
Maxfield. (Maxfield direct, Tr. Bk 2, p. 188).
4.

On page five of their brief, plaintiffs falsely state that Maxfield

testified on cross examination that the suitcase full of money which he brought
to the meeting and with which he made payment of the agreed delinquencies
at the time, came from his transactions with the Unitah Finance Company; that
the company was insolvent; that he preferred to take his interest in business
transactions in cash; that he did not believe in bank accounts, checking books,
or record keeping. .Finally they actually make a factual statement, i. e. that
none of those "facts" are contained in appellants1 record.
they are not.

I should hope to shout

The reason they are not is because the record flatly contradicts

every one of them.

-e;k^ i

On cross examination (Tr. Bk 3, p. 65, 66) Maxfield stated that the
Unitah Finance Company, rather than being insolvent, was in fact solvent
and presently operating under a different name.

-

There is no testimony that the

money came from Maxfieid's transactions with Unitah Finance Company. In
fact, on direct (Tr. Bk. 2, p. 174) he stated that he sold his stock in Unitah
Finance Company and other "Unitah" companies, for a combination of cash and
other stock.

He flatly denied that he "preferred" to take cash, (Maxfield cross

Tr. Bk. 3, p. 66) or that he did not believe in banks or record keeping. (Cross
of Maxfield, Tr. Bk. 3, p. 76 & 81).
5.

The first two paragraphs of page six of plaintiffs1 brief makes

the point that plaintiffs assumed Maxfield had "all the outstanding interests"
and was willing to take the title in whatever shape it happened to be.

This

contention will be discussed in detail in point I of the argument herein.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Suffice

it to say that all objective evidence in the record is to the contrary.
These same two paragraphs make the point that Maxfieid was very
abrasive and threatening, thereby coercing the Bagnails into signing the
modification agreement.

Again, the record is just the contrary.

Mr. Tibbs,

the Bagnails then attorney, stated on cross examination (Tr. Bk. I, p. 107)
that Maxfieid did not coerce the Bagnails, and that the arrangement was purely
voluntary and based upon his recommendation.
6. On page seven of their brief, plaintiffs state that Maxfieid had
come to the Bagnails with complicated and fictional stories of title problems
he was encountering and that none of those problems had any basis in fact.

The

writer will merely refer the court to the judgment in favor of United Paint and
Colors quieting title to a 1/2 interest in 140. 15 acres of the ranch.
problem certainly seems to have a substantial basis in fact.

That title

Likewise, a persual

of the abstract and other exhibits will demonstrate that Jean Nyberg also alienated
. 57 acres (which apparently also now belongs to United Paint and Colors) that 1. 5
acres is inttie name of Caroline Hansen, and that 8. 06 acres are in the name of
J. A. Bagnail, plaintiff f s son.
7. On page 8 of their brief, plaintiffs make much of the point that the
Suburbia Land Company of Nevada filed a qualification statement in Utah and
attached articles that were different from those which had been filed in Nevada.
The implication is, of course, that there is chicanery afoot.

Again, the fraud

and chicanery is being practised by plaintiffs' counsel. A careful examination
of the documents submitted by the plaintiffs themselves to support this nonsense
(Exhibits P 39, 41) will show that the articles attached to the Utah application
inadvertently left off the first page of the articles, and that the copy of the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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amendment changing the name to Suburbia,

though providing for signatures by

all responsible officers, was not actually signed by them ail, although the
original filed in Nevada was. It seems plaintiffs find it necessary to make
mountains out of molehills and in fact are actively attempting to mislead the

8. Most of the "facts' 1 contained on pages 7, 8, and 9 of plaintiffs
brief are directed to the issue of alter-ego, and defendants will not attempt to
correct them (since they do not contest the court f s finding on that point) except
to say that virtually everything contained therein is not supported anywhere in
the record before the court, nor would it be supported if the few bits of missing
testimony were available.

. .-. .;

9. Plaintiffs' counsel on page 11 of their brief makes another false
statement that the Bagnalls had always paid the taxes on the ranch.

Even the

most careless examination of Mr. Bagnail f s testimony on c r o s s (Tr. Bk. tft#; Z$
p, 100) will show that even Bagnall concedes that Suburbia paid the taxes in 1962,
1964, 1968, and 1969.
10. On page 11 plaintiffs make the statement that respondents (plaintiffs)
never knew with whom they were dealing, that Maxfield had an elusive and
transient air about him, and that he dealt with corporations that came and went
like the wind. Such a statement is flatly contradicted by the record.

Mrs. Bagnall

on direct (Tr. Bk. 3, p. 43) stated that they dealt only with Reed Maxfield and had
knowledge of only the one corporation.
the Nevada or Utah corporations.

She flatly denied that they even knew of

Mr. Tibbs testified (Tr. Bk. 1, p. 83, 84) that

transfer of the property into the name of the Nevada corporation was contemplated
at the time of the signing of the modification agreement in July of 1962, and that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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he may even have prepared the assignment at that time. If we assume that
Bagnalls had knowledge of both the Idaho and the Nevada corporation, and then
maybe forgot about the transfer to the Nevada corporation, there exists
only one additional corporation with which they would have had to deal Suburbia Land Company of Utah, incorporated in 1968. Does this convey to the
reader any justification for plaintiffs 1 statement that corporations were coming
and going like the wind?
11. Plaintiffs contend that the record shows that Mr. Maxfield claimed
to have some $140, 000 in cash in a duffle bag at the time he made the first tender
in July, 1969. Again plaintiffs are distorting the facts.
any such claim.

Maxfield never made

On page 99 of the transcript, Mr. Maxfield, on cross-by

Jackson Howard testified that he had in excess of $15, 000 in cash on the premises.
And again in book 2, p. 330 of the transcript he stated that he had approximately
$20, 000 on hand.

Mr. Howard is obviously attempting to mislead the court, or

his memory is totally untrustworthy.
12. On page 12 plaintiffs make the statement that the jury, as well
as the court found that defendants 1 tenders were not made in good faith.
statement is also untrue.

This

The fact of the matter is that the jury found the tenders

to be in good faith, and the court overrulled the jury.

(See jury verdict form,

interrogatory no. 12) .
13. On page 12, plaintiffs again indluge in their fantasies, making
the assertion that defendants brief devotes a great deal of space showing that
plaintiffs-respondents were to render a title opinion as soon as possible.
Defendants brief devoted precisely 18 words in support of that proposition,
-9Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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14. On page 13 plaintiffs make light of the defendants statement
that the one-half interest in the 140. 15 acres of land comprises the central
portion of the ranch.

They go on to say that it is one of the lesser parts of

the land, poorly situated, and presently a bog. The testimony of Reed Maxfield
(Tr. 234 et, seq.), the testimony of Lynn Nielsen (Tr. Bk. 2, p.204-225) and
exhibit D-38, all clearly show the relationship of the said 140. 15 acres to the
rest of the ranch.

There is no support in the record whatsoever for plaintiffs 1

characterization of the land.
15. On page 13, plaintiffs a s s e r t contrary to anything to be found in
the record, that Phillips Oil Company had checked the title to the property,
considered the title to be clear and took lease on the basis that the title was
clear.

Such statement is not supported by the record.

The truth is, although this

is not in the record either, that the title opinion rendered by Phillips attorney is
replete with flaws and defects in title which Phillip's counsel recommends be
corrected. •.••:.'•

.

.k^.;-..

16. On page 15 of their brief, plaintiffs make much of the fact that
defendants' counsel, in discussing the July 5, 1969 tender made by Reed Maxfield
on behalf of Suburbua Land, referred to Mr. Maxfield as the "then president 11 of
Suburbia.

Counsel candidly admits that to be an e r r o r .

Maxfield should have

been characterized as f,agentM or as "acting on behalf" of Suburbia as he was in
the very next sentence. Apart from this one oversight, every other statement in
defendants' Statement of Facts is true and supported by the record.
apologizes for this one misstatement.

The writer

*

17. On page 17 of their alleged "brief" plaintiffs make the statement
that the $400 payment received by the Bank of Ephriam was received by virtue of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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an order of the court that it be conditionally held in a separate account.

The

writer challanges plaintiffs to produce such an order, and will even stipulate
that if such an order can be found by plaintiffs, that it be designated and made a
part of the record in this case. The statement is simply false. No such order
exists. Reference to Exhibit D-18 will demonstrate that the payment was
accepted by the bank with no restrictions and was duly posted to interest.

No

amount of deception and argument to the contrary by the plaintiffs can alter
the fact.
18. Counsel becomes weary with the necessity of responding to virtually
every statement made by the plaintiffs intheir statement of facts.

Virtually every

statement made by the plaintiffs is either flatly untrue, is only partially true,
or is unsupported by anything in the record.

To quote the plaintiffs themselves:

"It is particularly galling to the (defendants) to have an
emotional appeal made on 'facts 1 that are unsupported
or refuted by other witnesses in the record and which,
as presented, can only constitute a fraud upon this
court." Plaintiffs 1 brief, pp. 17 and 18, Emphasis added.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ARGUMENT
.-

POINT I

Mvxi^U

r\*v.r,-vr.

RESPONDENTS1 ATTEMPT TO VARY THE PLAIN MEANING OF THE
MODIFICATION AGREEMENT BY PAROL EVIDENCE SHOULD NOT BE SUSTAINED
The Modification Agreement dated July 16, 1962, read in conjunction with the letter of July 18, 1962, (which the trial court ruled was a part of
the Modification Agreement), tells the whole story.

If read together and if given

their obvious meaning, much of the folderol perpetrated by the plaintiffs simply
disappears.

These two documents were prepared by the sellers 1 attorney, and

the meaning of the words is clear and unambiguous.

If the Modification Agreement

were ambiguous (which we deny), any ambiguity contained therein should be
construed most strongly against the party selecting the words and drafting the
Agreement.

In other words,it should be construed most strongly against the

Bagnalls. Bryant vs. Deseret News Publishing C o . , 120 U. 241, 223 p . 2d. 355;
27 ALR 2d. 1131; Handley vs. Mutual Life

Insurance Co., 106 U. 184, 147 P. 2d.

310, 152 ALR 12 78; Restatement of Contracts, Vol. 1, Sec. 236; 12 Am. Jur.
Contracts, Sec. 252.
This common sense rule of construction against the person who
selected the language is particularly applicable in our case where Mrs. Bagnall
had 10 years experience in the real estate business (Tr. Bk. 2, pX5 7) during which time
she (a) wrote contracts, (b) established escrows, (c) showed real properties,
(d) negotiated contracts, (e) was aware of, and knew the importance of conveying
good title, (f) was knowledgable about assignments and evidence of ownership.

Mr.

Bagnall had been superintendant of schools for Sanpete County and had been an
administrator of schools in California (Tr. Bk. 3, p . 2 7). And, of course, Mr.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Tibbs, acting as attorney for the Bagnalls,was an experienced lawyer and fully
aware of the consequences of what was said and done.
The modification agreement, drafted by sellers' attorney, Don
V. Tibbs states:
"This agreement is made to modify a certain Real
Estate Agreement dated the 1st day of September, 1952
* * * (the buyers interest having been, according to the
Buyers herein, conveyed to Suburbia Land Company,
an Idaho corporation), now designated as Buyers. ff
The modification agreement goes on to say that:
n

The Sellers agree to place a Warranty Deed conveying
good and marketable title to the premises as described
in said agreement, together with all shares of water
stock owned by them in Escrow at the Bank of Ephriam,
Utah."
57-1-12, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, sets forth the covenants that
are part of the warranty deed:
"Such deed when executed . . . (constitutes conveyance)
with covenants from the grantor . . . that he is lawfully
seized of the premises; that he has good right to convey
the same; that he guarantees . . . the quiet possession
thereof; that the premises are free from all emcumbranees
?f

In the face of the clear and unambiguous language of the Modification
Agreement, and in the face of the statute legislating the effect of a warranty deed,
the Bagnalls attempt to change the plain meaning by their self serving statements
that a total stranger (Reed Maxfield) verbaly represented to them that he had
acquired all outstanding titles and had deeds for them.

(Tr. Bk. 2, p . 24),

Consistent with the Modification Agreement and the purport of the statute, Mr.
Maxfield claimed that all he bought was the buyers interest under the contract,
(Tr. Bk. 2, p. 23 9), and the sellers attorney said that he put the buyers
-13-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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representations in the Modification Agreement. (Tr. Bk. I , p . 103).
Not only is it inconsistent to believe that Mr. Maxfield represented
he had acquired all outstanding titles and was willing to take the title from
Bagnalls in whatever condition it should be found, but it is contradictory to the
testimony of the plaintiffs themselves.

During cross examination of J. R. Bagnall

(Tr. Bkv 2, pp. 23-27), he stated that he asked Maxfield, at the time of the
formation of the Modification Agreement, such questions as (a) What interest
do you own? (b) What property do you own? (c) Who did you buy from? (d) What
did you pay for the interests? (e) What documents do you have? and etc.
To each of these questions, Mr. Maxfield purportedly replied; "None of your
business".

Further support for the appellants' position is garnered from the

testimony of plaintiffs' own attorney, Don Tibbs, who stated (T-104, 105) that
he thought there might be some minor defects which they would have to clear up.
If plaintiffs are to be believed, we must believe that a total stranger,
carrying a suitcase full of money, walked unexpectedly into the office of Mr. Tibbs,
where the Bagnalls just happened to be, demanded that he be recognized as the
legitimate owner of the ranch claimed to have acquired all outstanding titles,
refused to divulge any information whatsoever about his acquisition, and, based
upon such representations by Maxfield, the Bagnalls, upon the advise of their
attorney, agreed to deliver a warranty deed. (Tr, Bk. 2,

p. 25).

Then, having resolved all questions of title (remember plaintiffs
claim Maxfield had acquired all defects to his own satisfaction) the Modification
Agreement, as supplemented by the letter of July 18, 1962 (Exhibit P-6) was
prepared and makes the following declaration:
-14-
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"So, also, the undersigned agree to clear up any defects
that may be shown in the title concerning the property as
set forth in the Modification Agreement, within 18 months
from date, it being understood that the Abstract shall be
examined and a Title Opinion rendered as soon as possible.
(Emphasis added. )

I!

Where the contract is clear and unambiguous and all of the t e r m s
are explicit and certain, as in our case, the contract is not open to construction.
Burt vs. Stringfellow, 45 U. 207, 143 p. 234. Bagnalls attempt to intruduce oral
testimony to either (a) show that the contract is ambiguous, or (b) change the
t e r m s of the agreement, is clearly contrary to Utah law.

78-25-16, Utah Code

Annotated, 1953 provides as follows: "There can be no evidence of the contents
of a writing other than the writing itself, except . . . "
pertinent herein are then enumerated.

Certain exceptions not

The Utah courts have long held that in

the absence of fraud or mistake, parol evidence is not admissable to contradict,
vary, add to, or subtract from the terms of a valid written instrument.

Fox Film

Corp. vs. Ogden Theatre Co., 82 U. 279, 17 P. 2d. 294, 90 ALR 1299; Last
Chance Ranch Co. vs. Erickson, 82 U. 475, 25 P. 2d, 952.
One must either believe that the Modification Agreement, the July
18 letter, and the Warranty Deed set forth the understanding of the parties, or,
one must believe that Mr. and Mrs. Bagnall, along with their attorney, Judge
Tibbs, were incredibly stupid.

It is simply impossible to believe their story

that they accepted Maxfields alleged representations and, in reliance thereon,
conveyed to him by warranty deed.

Clearly they must have known, at that time,

that when Maxfield conveyed the property, and defects in title was later discovered,
they would be bound by their warranties to defend the title for the transferee.

Both

Tibbs and the Bagnalls;would have been keenly aware of such possibility and one
must conclude that they believed they had good title, not that they relied upon
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Maxfield's representations, (cf Tibbs testimony Tr. Bk. 1, pp. 104-105; Bagnall

2

T r . Bk. 2, p. 23).

-16-
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POINT II
RESPONDENTS FAILED TO ELICIT ANY BELIEVABLE PROOF THAT
THE DEFENDANTS WERE UNABLE TO PERFORM THEIR TENDER
Pages 20 to 29 of the respondents arguments a r e so shot full of
e r r o r s , untruths and outright fabrications that it is difficult for the writer to
respond.

Many of the more blatant e r r o r s and fabrications were referred to in

the Statement of Facts herein. Others, but by no means not all, will be covered
at this time.
Practically all of the alleged "facts" referred to on pages 20, 21,
and 22 of the plaintiff's brief are, by their own admission unsupported by anything before the court.

For that reason alone, the alleged "facts" cannot be

considered by the court.

On page 22, plaintiffs state that Maxfield was caught

in one lie after another.

Yet no examples are given except the dubious statement

that he testified that he did not know that a corporation had to do such things
as maintain its charter in good standing. Not one other "lie" is reported.

It

is the w r i t e r ' s firm belief that plaintiffs failed to enumerate Maxfield's "lies"
because there were none of any consequence.

Mr. Howard must have been

thinking of his own client J. R. Bagnall who was in fact caught in one lie after
another. (See defendants appeal brief, point IX).
Respondents' argument under their Point II is replete with factual
inaccuracies, incorrect citations, and outright misstatement of the facts as
disclosed by the record.

On page 23 Mr. Howard states that the court and jury
BAP
found the tenders to be made in ge&4 faith. The truth of the matter is that the
jury found fo£ the defendants on this point (see special interrogatory number 12)
and the court overrulled the jury and granted the plaintiffs! motion for judgment
-17-
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not withstanding the verdict.
On page 24 of their brief, respondents go into some detail concerning
the testimony of Bruce Watkins, Clearfield State Bank manager who testified
on behalf of the appellants.

Plaintiffs brief states that Mr. Watkins testimony

was to the effect that the most the bank had before it was a loan application made
out months prior and which had not been acted upon.

The references given (Tr.

Bk. 2, p . 232) makes it very clear that the bank had committed to make the loan
and would have gone through with it if Maxfieid had pursued it.
Mr. Howard writes that the loan was to be made upon the security
of the land in Sanpete County. Again, this is contrary to the testified facts.

On

cross examination (Tr. Bk. 3, p. 51) Mr. Watkins unequivically stated that the
loan was to be made upon the security of the corporate stock.

He goes on to say

that the value of the stock would depend upon the balance sheet, that a financial
statement had been submitted and that it showed a net worth of $100, 000 to
$200,000. (Tr. Bk. 3, p. 49). Contrary to this cited testimony, Mr. Howard
states that Watkins testified that he had not seen a financial statement.
Plaintiffs references to the record as contained on pages 24 and 25
of their brief do not support their statements, In fact, a close examination of the
transcribed testimony of Bruce Watkins will show that Mr. Howard was deliberately
trying to confuse the witness by asking such questions: "Suppose you found the
corporation charter had been revoked in 1968 ? M (Tr. 55). Such a question was
improper because the corporate charter had not, in fact, been revoked in 1968.
That was the date the Utah corporation was formed, and it had not been suspended
until after September 15, 1971. The court is invited to read Mr. Howard's cross
examination of Mr. Watkins, and form its own conclusions.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Plaintiffs constantly, throughout their brief, poke fun at
defendants testimony concerning the large amounts of cash which Mr. Maxfield
kept around the house, and attempt to confuse the court with such statements as
that found on page 22 of their brief wherein it is claimed that Maxfield claimed
to have $140, 000 in a duffle bag in his closet. As was earlier pointed out, such
was not Maxfield's claim.

He only claimed to have something in excess of $15, 000

around the house. Such a claim is not unreasonable in view of the plaintiffs' own
testimony that he had large amounts of money in a suitcase when they first met him,
(Bagnall Tr. Bk. 2, pp. 21-22) and in light of Don Tibbs testimony that he had money
coming out of his pockets, and everywhere. (Tibbs Tr. Bk. 1, p . 99).
If we examine carefully what was testified to at the trial we find
the following:
1. 1962, Reed Maxfield, together with his brother Lindon and
his father E. R. Maxfield, sold their stock interest in the "Uintahs" for
$550,000.

(Maxfield Tr. Bk. 2, pp. 174-177).
2. It was right after this sale that Mr. Maxfield was carrying

large amounts of cash, and may have had as much as $140, 000 in cash at the ranch,
although he stated he did not remember having that much in the house. (Maxfield
T r . Bk. 2, p . 330).
3. By 1969, for reasons not entirely clear from the record, much
of that cash had been spent or was otherwise unavailable to Maxfield.

During

the year 1969, Maxfield had found it necessary to borrow on two occasions from
the Bank of Ephriam, and, at the time of the July 5, 1969 tender, had on hand
$15, 000 to $20, 000, and one-half of that sum came from the loans from the Bank
of Ephriam.

(Maxfield Tr. Bk. 2, p . 330). Such amounts of cash on hand, and
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the propriety of borrowing in limited amounts is entirely consistent with the
testimony of Mr. Maxfield, and also the testimony of Bruce Watkins, Clearfield
State Bank branch manager who testified that the Suburbia corporation had a net
worth, according to the balance sheet of $100, 000 to $200, 000. (Watkins, T r . Bk.
3, p. 49). There is nothing inconsistent with the testimony of Maxfield that the
bank had committed a loan of $15, 000 which, together with the $20, 000 already
on hand, was believed by Maxfield to be sufficient to pay off the contract in full.
(Maxfield, Tr. Bk. 2, p. 232).
As can readily be seen, Maxfield did not, and does not, claim to
have huge amounts of cash on hand during 1969, and the following years, but
he does claim to have had sufficient to meet the tenders had they in fact been
accepted.

- 2 0 - J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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POINT III
RESPONDENTS ACCEPTED A PAYMENT AFTER THEIR NOTICE OF
MAY 25, 1970, AND, THEREFORE REINSTATED THE CONTRACT
Point V of the plaintiffs 1 brief makes the point that this writer,
"in accordance with appellants usual candor . . .

M

failed to mention that the

defendants 1 payment of $400 to the escrow, December 1, 1971 was surreptitously
made to the e.scrow in a deliberate effort to develop a waiver.

Even if that be

true, the operative fact is, did the escrow, as agent for the plaintiff, accept
the payment or did it not? It is quite evident as pointed out in Point V of
defendants' brief that the payment was accepted.
On page 30 of plaintiffs 1 brief they again practice deception upon
the court. Respondents state that the payment was held by the bank in a special
account by order of Judge Erickson.

This writer challanges respondents and

their counsel to produce any such order by Judge Erickson or anyone else.
simply does not exist.

It

They state that appellants did not designate such order.

It is obvious that we could not designate a non-existant order. As further deception
practised by the respondents,
from the Bank of Ephriam.

they refer to plaintiffs' Exhibit 11, as the record

Exhibit 11 bears the following statement:

"Not accepted. Court order by Judge Erickson to
place in special fund. "
Plaintiffs' attempt to foist this exhibit off on the court as genuine
is contemptible.

Exhibit 11 is a copy of the bank record and contains the above

notation, written thereon by Bagnall himself.

It is not, repeat, not on the original

record from the bank (Exhibit 18). The plaintiffs' witness from the bank, Edgar
Anderson stated (Tr. Bk. 1, p . 34) that defendants' Exhibit 18 was the correct
record, and that the notation on plaintiffs' Exhibit 11 was undoubtedly placed there
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by Bagnall himself. As is more fully pointed out under Point V of appellants;
appeal brief, the $400 payment was accepted by the bank, credited to interest,
the escrow fee withheld, and the balance forewarded to Bagnall, and ultimately
deposited in his checking account.

It is true that he then attempted to reject the

payment, but such rejection obviously came too late, and the contract was
therefore re-instated, if in fact, it had ever been validly forfeited at all.
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POINT IV
THE RECORD AS DESIGNATED AND AS FILED WITH THE COURT IS
MORE THAN SUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO OVERRULE THE
TRIAL COURT AND TO AWARD JUDGMENT IN DEFENDANTS' FAVOR
Points 1 through VII of defendants 1 appeal brief are, for the most
part, appeals on questions of law and do not depend, in most instances, upon
any testimony. Where they may depend upon testimony, all revelant testimony
is before this court. Respondents contend that there is not sufficient record
before the court upon which to form a decision or upon which it can overrule the
trial court.

They then go through a little charade on pages 33 and 34 of their

brief attempting to show that vast quantities of testimony and exhibits are
missing. Appellants have, in their Statement of Facts herein, responded to
some of the false implications of respondents' charade.

Some additional

comment is required at this time.
On the second line of page 34, plaintiffs point out that defendants
designated ,f all testimony of Edgar R. Anderson 1 ', which is correct.

Then on the

first line up from the bottom on that same page they state that defendants failed to
designate "all testimony of Edgar Anderson", which is, of course, incorrect.
They cannot keep it straight themselves.

On the eighth line up from the bottom

they state that defendants did not designate the testimony of Lavera Maxfield.
certainly did not, and could not have done so since she did not testify.

We

In their

list of other testimony not designated, plaintiffs fail to point out to the court that
the r e - d i r e c t of J. R. Bagnall is in fact before the court; that the court has 68
pages of the cross of Reed Maxfield; that the court has the cross and re-direct of
Lester R. Romero; that the court has all direct and r e - d i r e c t of Florence Bagnall;
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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that the testimony of Lynn Nielson is before the court; that the testimony of
Robert Lord (defendants 1 counsel) went only to the question of attorneys fees
and is not questioned on appeal; nor that the direct testimony of J. R. Bagnall
and Don V. Tibbs was fully explored on cross and that the cross fairly reflects
the direct.
Likewise, plaintiffs do not tell the court that of the exhibits
allegedly ommited from the designation, the court actually has plaintiffs 1 8,
12, 13, 19 - 26, 28, 33, 35, 37, 38, 39, 41 - 48, and 54 - 58. Contrary to what
plaintiffs are attempting to tell the court, even though appellants

designation

of exhibits did not include all of appellants exhibits only four (40, 41, 45 and 48)
are not actually onfile with the court. Those few not before the court are duplicalted
by other exhibits actually designated, or they had little if any probative value.

It

is the defendants 1 position, and it was so stated by the undersigned in appellants 1
motion to strike the plaintiffs 1 brief, that all relevent evidence is before the court.
Rule 75 (a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the appellant
shall, within ten days after filing of the notice of appeal, file his designation.
Within ten days thereafter, any other party to the appeal may serve and file a
designation of additional portions of the record, proceedings, and evidence.

The

obvious purport of the rule is to allow the appellant to designate those portions
of the record he feels he needs for his appeal.

Then, any other party who feels

that the designated portion may shortchange him, may file a designation for
additional portions.

If the appellant must designate the entire record, then why

Rule 75 (a)? And if appellant states that the record as designated fairly reflects
the t r i a l testimony, and respondent disagrees, he (respondent) should designate
such additional as he feels necessary.

Rule 75 (e) requires that the record be
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abbreviated and that all matter not essential to the decision of the questions
presented by the appeal be omitted.

That is precisely what appellants have done.

If plaintiffs do not like it, they should have designated whatever else they felt
necessary as provided by 75 (a).
Two varieties of cases have come before the Utah Supreme Court
in which the failure to provide a complete transcript of the proceedings below has
been stated as a ground for disposition of the appeal, i. e. (a) those in which no
transcript at all was provided; and (b) those in which only a partial transcript
was designated.
NO TRANSCRIPT PROVIDED. Respondents refer to the case of
Buchanan vs. Crites, 106 Utah 428, 150 P 2d. 100 (1944) in support of their
proposition that appellants 1 appeal should be dismissed because the entire record
was not designated.

In fact the case is not directly in point because no transcript

was designated in that case. Even so, the ruling of the court is instructive:
"On appeal the appellant has the burden of showing
wherein the trial court erred. If the record is not
sufficient to determine a material question because
of the fact that the appellant failed to bring enough
of it before us, the doubts should be resolved in
favor of sustaining the judgment. " (Emphasis added. )
The reader will note that the court clearly stated that if the record
were sufficient to determine the question, or if enough of the record were before
it, it could overrule the t r i a l court.

Such a principle is also set forth in the case

of Watkins vs. Simonds, 385 P. 2d. 154, 14 U. 2d. 406 (1963) in which the Utah
court said:
"Judgments of courts are presumed to be correct if
nothing in the record appears to the contrary, and all
doubts a r e resolved in their favor. The record on
appeal in this case, being devoid of any and aii
evidence, it must be assumed that the proceedings in
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
-25
- contain errors.
Machine-generated OCR,
may

the court below established a sufficient basies
to support and justify the court ! s findings, conclusions and judgment, n (Emphasis added.)
In other words, where no transcript is provided, the court, quite
properly can make no determination as to whether the record sustains the t r i a l
court or not.
PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT PROVIDED.

The recent case of Nagle

vs. Club Fontainbleu, 17 U. 2d. 125, 405 P . 2d. 346 (1965) is instructive on
this point. In that case the court stated:
"Only a partial transcript of the trial, containing
exerpts from the testimony has been brought here.
Upon reading it we perceive therein nothing which
would compel a determination contrary to that made
by the t r i a l court. " (Emphasis added.)
Again the court pays homage to the principle that it could r e v e r s e
the court below if there were compelling evidence, even though all had not been
designated.

This writer submits that the problem will be discussed by the court

only in cases involving a partial transcript where there has been insufficient
evidence before the court to reverse the decision below.

The majority opinion

would likely never discuss the problem where they felt there was enough evidence
before them to r e v e r s e .
Even Rule 10 of the Federal Rules requires only the inclusion of
all evidence relevent to the findings and conclusion. The writer again states
that, in his opinion, all such relevent testimony is before the court.

If

respondents feel that additional testimony is necessary, they had every opportunity
virtually
to bring it up. In fact they did designate-all testimony and exhibits not designated
by the appellants, and then changed their minds and un-designated the remainder.
The court starts with the presumption that the judgment of the t r i a l court is
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sustained by the evidence. When the court has sufficient of the record before it
to compel a contrary finding, then the presumption that the trial court was correct
must fall.
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POINT V
PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO GIVE APPELLANTS AN ACCOUNTING
Plaintiffs 1 brief states in point III, that "respondents
to give an accounting to the appellants.

n

never refused

A quick Look at the testimony of Mr.

Bagnall himself wiLl put the Lie to the above statement.

F o r instance, Mr.

Barker, attorney for Reed Maxfield, was questioning Mr. Bagnall on the
feasibility of the buyers obtaining the amount of delinquencies from the bank:
Q. When you received these requests for an accounting, did you
ever write back and say, Here's the information I have that the bank doesn't have,
you can get the rest of the information from the bank, or something to that
effect?
A. No. We were too busy trying to get them to pay something.
(Bagnall, Tr. Bk. 2, P. 101).
Again, on page 103, Mr. Howard asks Mr. Bagnall the following
question:
MR. HOWARD: The question is, did you call them up and tell
them what the accounting was:
THE WITNESS: No.
MR. HOWARD: I suppose that's it.
F r o m the foregoing direct testimony, and the implications drawn
from the testimony as a whole, one can only conclude that no accounting was given
as requested.
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POINT VI
DEFENDANTS WERE ENTITLED TO AN ACCOUNTING BOTH BEFORE
AND AT THE TIME OF THEIR TENDERS
Plaintiffs, on page 10 of their brief, lists a so called ommission
of facts not disclosed by the appellants in their appeal brief.

Basically they

say that appellants did not disclose that on the date of the modification agreement
(July 16, 1962), the balance owing on the contract was $54, 142. 14, and by the
time of trial, April 22, 1974, the balance had increased to $63, 298. 64. The
writer admits that the modification agreement states that:
3" It is believed by the undersigned that as of August
1, 1962, there is a balance due on the principal of
$54, 142. 14, which principal balance is subject to auditing
and adjustment by either party. This takes into consideration a payment of $2, 800 made this date. The undersigned
acknowledges that there is no present default in the contract
payments and that the parties are hereafter bound strictly
in accordance with the terms of this agreement. M (Exhibits
D-20, P-5)
The writer further acknowledges that plaintiffs exhibit 12 shows a
total balance due under the contract of $63, 298. 64

Defendants do not acknowledge

that these are the true facts so far as the actual balances due a r e concerned.

As

quoted above, the modification agreement states that the parties believe the balance
to be $54. 142. 14. The contract itself acknowledges that there is some doubt and
provides for an audit and adjustment of the balance by either party.

The agree-

ment further provides that with the receipt of a payment of $2, 800, there a r e
no defaults in the contract payments.

The testimony of the plaintiffs themselves

will demonstrate that the correct balance should have been $30, 954. 72.
Mrs. Bagnall testified on direct examination (Tr. Bk. 3, p . 32)
concerning the $54, 142. 14 balance referred to in the modification agreement, and
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the method by which they arrived at the balance, as follows:
Q. All right. Now, how did you arrive at the figure for the
assumption, the debt, the amount of the contract, the contract figure?
A. Well, we had records then of the payments of the delinquencies,
and with help of our attorney, we arrived at this figure.
On cross examination (Tr. Bk. 2, p. 91) Mr. Barker asked Mr.
Bagnall,

Paragraph three says: It is believed by the undersigned that as of

August 1, 1962, there is a balance due on the principal of $54. 142. 14, which
principle balance is subject to auditing and adjustment by either party.

!!

Now

what does the word "auditing11 mean to you. If
A. It meant a check might be made of it according to the

to

the records that we had and so forth, I suppose. I don ! t know.
On cross examination (Tr. Bk. 2, p. 89) Mr. Bagnall admits
that the payment records prior to July 16, 1962, are not available and that an
audit would be impossible without them.
never any request for an audit.

On page 90 he states that there was

Such statement is not very pursuasive, however,

since he could not even remember the request for an accounting contained in the
tender letters, (pp. 90)
And finally, a look at the testimony of Don Tibbs (Tr. Bk. 1, pp. 104,
105) reveals the following colloquy:
Q. Wheren f t you concerned about dealing with somebody who didn't
present any documents?
A. I figured if we could get the money out of them and bring that
contract up to date that I would let them worry about it.
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Then further down on the page he says:
11

. . . but I thought that if he could bring that contract
current and the persons claiming under the purchaser
would pay, that f s all Mr. Bagnall wanted. He wanted
the money that was due him under the contract and that
was all and I thought this was the best way of getting it
to that point and frankly, when Mr. Maxfield showed up
with so much money, I thought it was a good deal, I
thought the deal was over. I dismissed my Lawsuit and
he paid the money and he paid me my attorney's fee and
I thought it was all said and done except for some miscellaneous things that there was something wrong with the
title which wouldn't show up until the abstract was
completed. "
Plaintiffs, on page five of their brief state that Maxfield
made payment of the delinquencies in small denomination bills, and Maxfield
testified on direct that he was not satisfied with the $54. 142. 14 balance and
Mr. Tibbs said that in order to get the matter settled he could audit the account.
(Tr. Bk. 2, p. 236). Put this all together, and what do we have? We simply
have a contract that was only seven months delinquent in 1962. Payment of
that delinquency in the amount of $2, 800 was made and all parties acknowledged
that all delinquent payments had been made. That state of facts was inconsistent
with the stated balance due, and the account was to be reviewed and adjusted.

How

could this be done? Mr. Bagnall states that the records were subsequently lost
and that without them an audit could not be performed.

If that be true, then we

must ,f audit n from the documents and the testimony of the parties.
If payment of the $2, 800 paid all delinquent payments (the parties
and the agreement itself say that it does), then the $400 monthly payments must
be considered to have been made between September 1, 1952, and July 16, 1962.
Apportioning those payments to principal and interest we discover that the total
sum of $21, 277. 34 has been paid in interest, and the total sum of $24, 277. 66 paid
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on the principal, bringing the balance due, as of August 1, 1962, to $30, 954. 72.
With this state of affairs, the Court will readily see that defendants clearly
needed an accounting before they could effect their tenders, and the court will
see why defendants did not make reference in their appeal brief to the
amounts plaintiffs claimed to be due and owing.
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POINT VII
THE OVERWHELMING WEIGHT OF THE LEGAL PRINCIPLES AND ARGUMENTS
OF A P P E L L A N T S B R I E F COMPEL A JUDGMENT FOR THE A P P E L L A N T S
Appellants have tried, consistently to b a s e t h e i r a r g u m e n t s upon
the legal and factual i s s u e s as they developed before, during, and after the t r i a l .
Respondents, for the m o s t p a r t , have attacked the c h a r a c t e r and integrity of
appellants as well as t h e i r counsel.

Except for t h e i r point n u m b e r 10, which

w a s a s t r a i g h t foreward legal a r g u m e n t , virtually everything e l s e in t h e i r brief
boils down to the position that the appellants a r e conniving, lieing, cheating,
d i s r e p u t a b l e c h a r a c t e r s and t h e r e f o r e judgment for the plaintiffs, who a r e honest,
hardworking, s t a l w a r t p i l l a r s of the community should be affirmed.

In addition

to all that has been said h e r e i n concerning the r e l a t i v e m e r i t s of plaintiffs and
defendants positions, t h e s e final c o m m e n t s will help illuminate the shallowness
of the plaintiffs a r g u m e n t s .
1. Point 1 of appellants appeal brief l i s t s 10 m a j o r defects in the
title to the land the s e l l e r s w e r e supposed to deliver to the b u y e r s .

T h o s e defects

c o n s i s t e d of the following:
1) E n c r o a c h m e n t of the r a i l r o a d r i g h t of way.
2) E n c r o a c h m e n t of the county road.
3) L o s s of 1/2 i n t e r e s t in 140. 15 a c r e s .
4) L o s s of the fee s i m p l e i n t e r e s t in . 57 a c r e s containing the
residences.,
5) P r o p e r t y in the n a m e of s e l l e r s ' son J. A. Bagnall.
6) P r i v a t e e a s e m e n t s .
7) U n r e l e a s e d lis pendens.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
oo

8) 1. 5 a c r e s in n a m e of Sharp and Hansen.
9) Oil and gas l e a s e s .
10) F a i l u r e to deposit w a t e r stock within the t i m e allowed by the
contract.
In r e s p o n s e to appellants 1 a r g u m e n t about t h e s e defects, the plaintiffs 1
brief r e s p o n d s to only two of the admitted defects, i. e. the oil and gas l e a s e s , and
the p r o b l e m concerning the 140. 15 a c r e s .

In attempting to justify o r excuse the

defect evident in the title to the 140. 15 a c r e s , plaintiffs s t a t e on page L8 of t h e i r
brief that:
" C o n t r a r y to the a s s e r t i o n s of the appellants, the
question of m a r k e t a b l e title was n e v e r a point of i s s u e
since Maxfield r e p r e s e n t e d to Mr. Tibbs and to the
s e l l e r s that he had acquired all of the balance of the
outstanding i n t e r e s t of the p a r t i e s . " ( E m p h a s i s a d d e d . )
Even if that w e r e t r u e , which it is not, the defects caused by the
r a i l r o a d right of way, the county, road, the p r o p e r t y in J. A. B a g n a l l ' s n a m e ,
the u n r e l e a s e d lis pendens, the p r i v a t e e a s e m e n t s , and the a c r e a g e in the n a m e
of Sharp and Hansen, s t i l l m u s t be contended with.
2.

Point II of appellants appeal brief d i s c u s s e s the w r i t t e n t e n d e r

m a d e by defendants, and the legal effects thereof.

Appellants r a i s e d the following

c o n s i d e r a t i o n s , among o t h e r s , in support of the validity of t h e i r t e n d e r s :
1) W r i t t e n t e n d e r s t e r m i n a t e d s e l l e r s right to default.
2) S e l l e r s demanded the a c c e l e r a t e d b a l a n c e which they had no
right to do.
3) Statute m a k e s proof of ability to pay i r r e l e v a n t .
4) T e s t of ability to pay would have been for s e l l e r s to accept tender.,
5) Legal m e a n i n g of the H y m a s , B a m b e r g e r , and S e i v e r t s c a s e s .
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6) Weight of evidence shows ability to pay.
7) S e l l e r s stipulated that t e n d e r s w e r e n e v e r accepted.
In r e s p o n s e to appellants brief, plaintiffs a r g u e only that the
weight of evidence shows the b u y e r s w e r e unable to p e r f o r m t h e i r t e n d e r s .

All

of the other six a r g u m e n t s r a i s e d by appellants a r e unanswered by the plaintiffs,
and in fact plaintiff specifically r e f u s e s to be drawn into a r e s p o n s e to defendants
a r g u m e n t that the t e n d e r s a r e effective r e g a r d l e s s of any showing, at this late
date, of b u y e r s ability o r lack of ability to p e r f o r m .
,f

it s e e m s futile for r e s p o n d e n t s to a r g u e the law n .

They state on page 24 that
The w r i t e r quite a g r e e s with

that last s t a t e m e n t , inasmuch a s the law, in w r i t e r ' s opinion, completely
s u p p o r t s the defendants 1 position.
3.

In r e s p o n s e to the a r g u m e n t s m a d e by appellants in t h e i r point

III, plaintiffs m a k e the false s t a t e m e n t that s e l l e r s n e v e r refused to give an
accounting.

Point V contained h e r e i n shows by the plaintiffs own t e s t i m o n y

that an accounting w a s , in fact, n e v e r given.

Plaintiffs m a k e no r e s p o n s e to the

a u t h o r i t i e s cited by defendants to support the legal r e q u i r e m e n t of an accounting
when r e q u e s t e d by t h e b u y e r .
4.

In point IV, appellants, in t h e i r appeal brief, d i s c u s s e d the

r e a s o n s why the s e l l e r s notice of default w a s defective, r a i s i n g at least the
following questions:
1) The wording of the notice is ambiguous.
2) D e m a n d s m o r e than is due, i m p r o p e r l y a c c e l e r a t i n g the balance
due u n d e r the c o n t r a c t .
3) R e a s o n s t h e amounts could not be known to the defendants.
4) Citation of a u t h o r i t i e s and t h e i r effect on t h i s c a s e .
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Plaintiffs 1 response, when all of the chaff is blown away, is to
the effect that the trial court found the notice valid, and that is that.
5. In point V of defendants 1 appeal brief the effect of the payment
of $400 to the escrow by the buyers after the service of the sellers notice of
default was discussed.

The following arguments were presented by defendants:

1) The bank, for purposes of receiving the payments, was the
agent of the sellers only.
2) The notice to quit was inconsistent with the notice of default,
thereby, waiving the default.
3) Bagnalls affirmation of the authority of the escrow, after default.
4) The legal effect of the acceptance of the payment by the bank.
In response to these arguments, plaintiffs refer to the spurious
Exhibit D-ll, and the non-existent order of Judge Erickson, to show that the
payment was never accepted.

They then go on to allege that because Erickson

ruled against defendants on this point, the affidavit of prejudice was filed by
defendants thereby obtaining a new judge. The writer can only say that the
affidavit speaks for itself, and was filed by counsel only after much soul searching,
and because of the firm belief that the judge had already determined how he wanted
the case to go as evidenced by his prediliction to rule adversely to the defendants
on motions before they had been heard, and his tendency to make rulings on matters
not even raised or argued by counsel.
F o r all practical purposes, plaintiffs make no meaningful response
to any of the arguments raised by defendants on this point.

-36-
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6.

In point VI of the appeal brief, appellants m a k e the point that

t h e i r proffers of proof before Judge E r i c k s o n and t h e i r offer to pay the money
into court should waive any default and r e i n s t a t e the c o n t r a c t .

Defendants m a k e

the following points:
1) Proffer of $80, 000 worth of savings c e r t i f i c a t e s to Judge
E r i c k s o n , who refused the proffer.
2) Offer to pay $65, 000 into the r e g i s t r y of the court, and Judge
H a r d i n g s r e s p o n s e that it would not be n e c e s s a r y .
3) The setting up, by defendants, of an independant e s c r o w of
$65, 000 for payment to the plaintiffs.
4) The b u y e r s r i g h t s of redemption.
The only r e s p o n s e plaintiffs m a k e to any of this is the t a c i t
a d m i s s i o n that payment into the r e g i s t r y of court, o r its equivalent, would
r e i n s t a t e the contract, and then they simply s a y that payment should have been
m a d e to the court.

All o t h e r m a t t e r s r a i s e d by defendants a r e simply ignored in

the plaintiff s brief.
'

7. In point IX of appellants appeal brief, the following contradictions

in the plaintiffs f t e s t i m o n y w e r e listed:
1) Mr. Bagnall testified that the beginning balance set forth in
t h e modification a g r e e m e n t w a s a r r i v e d at from the sketchy r e c o r d s which they had.
M r s . Bagnall testified that they had complete and well kept r e c o r d s p r e p a r e d by a
c . p . A.- :••

-

:- '

'-'-V/.

2) J. R. Bagnall denied e v e r using his s o n ' s n a m e , yet he did u s e
it a s one of h i s own in a w a r r a n t y deed which he stated in his deposition w a s an
a t t e m p t to c l e a r the t i t l e .
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3) Plaintiffs claimed they n e v e r h e a r d of any c o r p o r a t i o n o t h e r
than the Idaho c o r p o r a t i o n .

Tibbs, t h e i r then attorney, testified that they knew

of the Nevada c o r p o r a t i o n and authorized the a s s i g n m e n t from the Idaho to the
Nevada c o r p o r a t i o n .

In addition they executed a deed to the Nevada c o r p o r a t i o n .

4) Bagnall c l a i m e d ownership to a t r a c t of 17. 45 a c r e s and said,
in h i s deposition that he had n e v e r been paid for it. After the defendants conclusively
proved that plaintiffs had no c l a i m to the 17. 45 a c r e s and had been paid in full
t h e r e f o r e in 1962, Mr. Howard stipulated to the c o u r t that they w e r e making no
claim thereto.
5) M r . Bagnall testified at the t r i a l , as a r e b u t t a l w i t n e s s , that M r .
Maxfield had m a d e only one t r i p to Bagnalls 1 home in California.

In h i s deposition,

Bagnall testified to t h r e e t r i p s .
6) Bagnalls and t h e i r attorney, stipulated at p r e - t r i a l that none of
the t e n d e r had been accepted.

At the t r i a l , Bagnall testified that he o r a l l y

a c c e p t e d the J u l y 5, 1969, t e n d e r .
7) Mr. Bagnall testified that she had n e v e r stated they would not
take p a y m e n t s , but w e r e d e t e r m i n e d to get the ground back.
that she in fact m a d e such a s t a t e m e n t .

Mr. Bagnall testified

<

/Ht/^r
In r e s p o n s e to t h e s e listed d i s c r e p e n c i e s , plaintiffs only as®€rte that
they a r e m i n o r and inconsequential.

Minor and i n c o n s e q u e n t i a l ? !

Had plaintiffs

had t h e i r way, they would have sought, and obtained, judgment granting t h e m t i t l e
to 17. 45 a c r e s to which they c l e a r l y had no right.

C e r t a i n l y the question of

„

w h e t h e r they accepted o r r e j e c t e d the defendants 1 t e n d e r offers is m o r e than a
m i n o r and inconsequential d i s c r e p e n c y .

What c r e d e n c e can be given to B a g n a l l s

t e s t i m o n y (unbelieveable in itself) that h e r e l i e d upon Mr. Maxfields r e p r e s e n t a t i o n s
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when he issued a warranty deed to property subject to defects of title, when
he cannot even remember whether he had been paid for the 17. 45 acres, cannot
remember whether the defendants tenders had ever been accepted, cannot even
recall a corporation (Nevada) to which he had issued deeds, and authorized the
assignment of the contract, and etc.
CONCLUSION
The very flagrant manner in which the respondents, through
their counsel, have sought to mislead the court by means of their erroneous and
fabricated "statement of facts" constitutes a gross abuse of counsel's obligations
and responsibilities to the court, and should be sufficient to warrant the court in
disregarding plaintiffs 1 brief in its entirety.

The writer does not lightly attack

counsel for the other side, however, the direct attack upon the integrity of the
writer by counsel for the plaintiffs leaves this writer no alternative but to point
out the e r r o r s and defalcations perpetrated by the writer of plaintiffs 1 brief.
After all the smoke and noise of battle has cleared away in this
case, at least one thing remains crystal clear.

That is the fact that the written

documents, i. e. the modification agreement, the 1952 contract, the warranty
deed put into escrow, and the letter of July 13, all explicitly require the plaintiffs
to deliver a marketable title free of encumbrances, liens, easements, encroachments,
adverse claims, and etc. This the plaintiffs were just as clearly unable to do.
Their sole defense is that Mr. Maxfield, at the time the modification agreement
was signed stated to them that he had all the outstanding titles and had deeds
to them. As was argued above, such a defense is unbelieveable, and is itself
at variance with the modification agreement which clearly states that he represented
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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to them that he had acquired the buyers interest under the contract.
Their attempt to vary the plain meaning of the written instruments
by parol evidence should not be allowed.
The Bank of Ephriam, acting solely as agent for the Bagnall, so
far as the receipt and disbursement of the payments was concerned, and before
any notice was given to them to terminate their agency, accepted a regular monthly
payment of $400, and, thereby, waived and invalidated the Notice of Forfeiture.

The

use of the escrow by the Bagnalls thereafter, reinforced the fact that the escrow
was still operative and had authority to act.
The court has before it, all necessary portions of the record and
the t r a n s c r i p t of testimony.

The testimony and the exhibits compel the court

to make a finding in favor of the defendants.
Contrary to respondents assertions that they never refused to give
the appellants an accounting, it is clear from the testimony that they in fact did not
do so after buyers request as contained in their letters of tender.

As was discussed

in point VI herein, an accounting or statement of some kind from the plaintiffs
was necessary before the defendants could determine what amount of money would
be required to clear the delinquencies.

The courts have held, in the proper

circumstances, that failure to give an accounting when requested is sufficient
grounds to prevent the buyers default for failure to pay.
It appears to the writer that the plaintiffs, in their reply brief,
are grasping at straws and have chosen to attack the defendants in the areas which
they consider to be the weakest, and to ignore all arguments for which they have no
answer.

Their failure to respond to many of the issues presented by appellants 1

appeal brief, constitutes a tacit admission of the validity of the points made by
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appellants.
F o r all of the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons set forth
in appellants appeal brief on file herein, the judgment should be reversed, the
complaint dismissed, the contract reinstated, and the matter remanded to the
district court for determination of the balance due under the contract, the amount
of the delinquencies, the amount of credits and offsets due appellants, and for such
other relief as m a y b e appropriate.
Costs and attorney fees should be awarded to the appellants defendants.
Respectfully submitted,
Robert L. Lord
118 Metro Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Defendant-Appellants

I here by certify that I mailed two copies of the foregoing, postage
prepaid, to Jackson Howard, for : HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON, 120 East
300 North, Provo, Utah 84601, Attorneys for Plaintiffs-Respondents, this
5th day of September, 1975.
ROBERT L. LORD
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APPENDIX f, A u
RESTATEMENT OF FACTS
On September 1, 1952, a r e a l estate agreement was entered into
between Hannah Bagnall and J. R. Bagnall, as sellers, and Wallace J. Nyberg,
Jean B. Nyberg, and Glenna A. Nyberg, as buyers.

(Exhibits P-3 and P-4)

The agreement appears to have been part of an overall settlement of the estate of
Hannah Bagnall, with the apparent motive being to divide up the estate at that time,
and as it later turned out, to avoid a probate.

(Tibbs c r o s s examination T r . Bk. 1,

pp. 71-72; Bagnall deposition pp. 6 and 7; Maxfield direct, T r . Bk. 2, p. 278)
Jean Nyberg, adopted daughter to Hannah, and one of the purchasers under the
agreement, was the owner in fee, apart from any interest acquired under the
contract, of . 57 acres on which one of the two homes on the property was
located, by virtue of a warranty deed dated January 20, 1939, from Joseph and
Hannah Bagnall. (Abst. vol. 107, p. 112, Exhb. P-8). She was also the owner of an
undivided 1/2 interest in 140. 15 acres of the land covered by the real estate agreement.

She held that interest as co-tenant with her brother, J. R. Bagnall, by

virtue of a warrancy deed dated January 30, 1939, by which Joseph F . Bagnall,
and Hannah Bagnall conveyed to the plaintiff, J. R. Bagnall, and to his sister, Jean
B. Nyberg, an undivided 1/2 interest in the said 140. 15 a c r e s . (Stipulated and included
in p r e - t r i a l order, R-55, 56). The real estate agreement also provided that Jean
had been given a $32, 000 interest out of Hannah's share, leaving a balance of $80, 000
equally divided between the two sellers, Hannah and J. R. Bagnall. {Real Estate
Agreement, P-4)
The real estate agreement was subsequently assigned to various
parties, until it was acquired by Suburbia Land Company of Idaho in July, 1962.
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(See Bagnall testimony, Tr. Bk. 2, pp. 7, 115). At that time, a modification
agreement was entered into between J. R. Bagnall and his wife, Florence as the
sellers, and Suburbia Land Company as buyer. (Exhibits P-5 and D-20) The
modification agreement incorporated the original September 1, 1952, agreement
and made certain modifications therein.

Among other changes, the sellers agreed

to place a warranty deed conveying good and marketable title, together with all
shares of water stock owned by them, in escrow at the Bank of Ephriam.

They

also agreed to deliver to the defendants an up-to-date abstract "as soon as possible",
and to clear up any defects that may be shown in the title within 18 months from
the date of the modification agreement.

(See modification agreement, P - 5 ,

and Bagnall's letter of July 18, D-20) The defendants herein contend that the
sellers were to render a title opinion !, as soon as possible" also.

(See defendants

Answer to Amended Complaint; Maxfield testimony T r . Bk. 2, p. 236.)
On March 3, 1962 , four and one-half months prior to the assignment
to Suburbia and the execution of the modification agreement, Jean Nyberg, by
warranty deed, deeded the aforementioned 140.15 acres and the . 57 acres to Utah
Valley Land and Development Corporation. (See R-72 and Exhibit P-56). The deed
purported to convey a fee simple title to all of the land. (P-56, R-72). Mrs. Nyberg
held the . 57 acres (upon which the main residence was located) in fee, but had only
an undivided one-half interest in the 140. 15 a c r e s . (Exhibit D-38; Nielsen T r . Bk.
2, p. 217; Maxfield Tr. Bk. 2, pp. 234 et. pretrial stipulations, R-55, 56), The
milking barn, tack room, corrals, and the bulk of all other improvements, with the
exception of the two residences, were located on the 140.15 acre tract. (Maxfield
Tr. Bk. 2, pp. 233, 234; Exhibit D-38)
A-2
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On October 5, 1971, Utah Valley Land conveyed those same interests,
by warranty deed, to United Paint and Colors Company, one of the defendants named
in plaintiffs 1 amended, amended complaint.

(Exhibit P-55) An o r d e r of Summary

Judgment and Decree of Quiet Title was granted in favor of United Paint and Colors
Company on March 26, 1974. by the above entitled court, thereby effectively
depriving the appellants of a 1/2 interest in the central part of the ranch containing
70% of the improvements. (R-73-75; Maxfield Tr. Bk. 2, pp. 234 et. seq.) The
matter of the . 57 acres has not yet been litigated.
One of the major concerns of Suburbia as buyer was the ability of
the sellers to deliver an unclouded title.

The sellers agreed to take upon them-

selves the burden of preparing an abstract and clearing any defects in the title.
(Exhibit P-6; Tibbs Tr. Bk. 1, pp. 88, 89) It was the contention of the buyers that
sellers were to render the title opinion also.
plaintiffs at the trial.

That contention was disputed by the

(Bagnall deposition, p. 35; Maxfield T r . Bk. 2, p. 202;

Appellants Answer to Amended Complaint R-252)

In any event, the Modification

Agreement (which consisted of the Agreement dated July 16, 1962, in conjunction
with a letter from seller to buyer dated July 18, 1962), provided that the sellers
were to complete their obligations within 18 months.

(Exhibits P-5 and P-6;

P r e t r i a l order R-53) The abstract was not completed until sometime in 1965,
according to the testimony elicited from the plaintiffs and their former attorney
and was never delivered to the defendants. (Tibbs Tr. Bk. 1, pp. 102, 103; P r e
trial stipulations R-56).

_ .

Plaintiffs took no action to clear any defects, maintaining that they had
an unclouded title, even to the 140. 15 acres and the . 57 acres, and that if was fully
marketable and complied with their obligations under the Real Estate Agreement and
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the Modification Agreement. (Tibbs, Tr. Bk. 1, p. 69; Bagnall deposition p. 15),
Throughout much of 1962 and through 1965, at least, Mr. Maxfield made constant
and repeated efforts to obtain the abstract from the plaintiffs or their attorney,
Don V. Tibbs. (Tibbs Tr. Bk. 1, p. 102), Beginning in 1963, and continuing
throughout 1965, Mr. Maxfield advised the plaintiffs of numerous title deficiencies.
(Tibbs, Tr. Bk. 1, pp. 91-94; Exhibit D-21; Maxfield Tr. Bk. 2, p. 273) He advised
them of claims made by third parties to the 140.15 acres which Jean Nyberg had
deeded away.

(Defendants were not then aware of the problem with the . 57 acres).

He advised them of claims made by a Mr. Don Powell to a 63 acre tract and to a
76. 94 acres tract, and so forth.

It was undisputed that Maxfield obtained deeds

from Mr. Powell, that he deeded the property therein to the Bagnalls, and that
they, in turn deeded it back to Suburbia of Nevada (one of the successor corporations).
(Maxfield T r . Bk. 2, pp. 274-2 77; Bagnall deposition pp. 57,59) There was dispute at
the trial as to the reasons therefore, and the effect thereof.

Defendants maintained

that it was to clear up some of the title defects and that plaintiffs agreed to a
moratorium on payments until December, 1971. Plaintiffs disagreed with that
contention, denying that there

had been any moratorium. (Maxfield Tr. Bk. 2,

p. 279; Exhibit D-30; Tr. 93-105).
During much of this time, and especially beginning in 1964, the
defendants were not making all of their payments. It was their contention that
many of those payments were missed with approval of the plaintiffs because of
their failure to obtain the abstract and to clear up the title defects. (Bagnall
deposition p. 89; Maxfield T r . Bk. 3, pp. 93-105) Also the plaintiffs were in
default.

As stated, they did not obtain the abstract until 1965. (Tibbs, Tr. Bk. 1,

pp. 102,103) They did not deliver it to the defendants. (Pre-trial stipulations, R-56)
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They did not render a title opinion.

They did not have all of the water stock in

the escrow as agreed until 1973! (Exhibit D-13; Bagnall, Tr. Bk. 3 , p. 54; Anderson
Tr. Bk. 1, p. 24). Joseph Albert Bagnall, son of the plaintiff, is the owner of
record of approximately 5. 56 acres of the ground. (Abst. vol. 105,p.37) the Denver
and Rio Grande Western Railway is the owner in fee simple of a strip one chain
by 40 chains along the eastern boundary and has an easement continuing along
the balance of the eastern boundary of the ranch, all taking about 3 a c r e s .

There

is a county road running through the middle of the ranch not mentioned in the contract
or the warranty deed consuming 2 a c r e s .

(P-7 Wanlass , Tr. Bk. 2, p. 345-359)

Defendants allege a private easement consuming about one acre also runs through
the ranch and is not mentioned in any of the conveyances of agreements.
On April 25, 1962, suit was commenced to forfeit the agreement
and a lis pendens was recorded.

(Abstract p 183). That lis pendens has not been

removed of record and constitutes a cloud on the title.

On February 18, 1970,

plaintiff entered into an oil and gas lease to Phillips Petroleum which included
all of the property contemplated in the Real Estate Agreement (which even included
the property belonging to J. A. Bagnall and 17. 54 acres of land which the buyers
had purchased outright at the time of the signing of the modification agreement in
1962), wherein they purported to lease all of the oil and gas rights to the property,
as well as all of the water rights with the exception of well waters.

(Exhibit D-34;

Exhibit D-33; Bagnall Tr. Bk. 2, p. 77, 33) This, of course, constituted a deliberate
cloud upon the title, even though Phillips probably could not prevail in a suit with
the buyers. (See ruling in the p r e - t r i a l order)
During the latter part of June, 1969, it became apparent to Reed R.
Maxfield, acting on behalf of Suburbia Land Company, of Utah, that the plaintiffs
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could not comply with their agreement and were about to attempt forfeiture of the
contract.

On July 5, 1969, Mr. Maxfield, acting on behalf of Suburbia, made a

written tender to plaintiff, J. R. Bagnall, of "any and all amounts that are due
. . . under the t e r m s of . . . (the) real estate contract.

,f

As part of that tender

Suburbia asked the plaintiffs to tell them how much was due. There were no
restrictions or conditions attached to the tender.

(Exhibit P-15)

Plaintiffs

rejected the tender and asked, instead, not for the delinquencies due under the
contract, but demanded the full accelerated balance due in two separate letters.
(Pre-trial order, R-52; Exhibits P-16 and P-17) There was no provision in the
contract for an acceleration. (Tr. Bk. 2, p. 166; Exhibit P-4) Defendants again
tendered, in writing, payment of the delinquencies, without acceleration, and
asked the plaintiffs to set forth the amount.

(Exhibit P-18). That tender was

never accepted by the plaintiffs either ( P r e - t r i a l stipulation, R-57).
Within a few days of the July 5 tender, Mr. and Mrs. Bagnall went to
the Maxfields' house on the ranch at Chester.

They testified that they came to accept

the tender (a position wholly contrary to their stipulation that they never accepted
the tender), while the defendants testified that they were told by the Bagnails
at that time that they did not want the money, they were determined to take the
ranch back. (Bagnall Tr. Bk. 2, p. 109; Maxfield Tr. Bk. 2, p. 299; P r e - t r i a l
stipulation R-57)
On July 31, 1970, a notice of default was served upon Reed R.
Maxfield, demanding the whole of the accelerated balance due under the agreement,
together with interest and penalties in an unspecified amount, and taxes. (P-31)
Lester Romero, then president of Suburbia of Utah, the only surviving corporation,
was advised of the notice and contacted plaintiffs 1 attorney, Merlin O. Baker, and
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once again tendered payment in writing of all amounts actually due on the contract
and asked the plaintiffs to specify the amount due. (Exhibit P-32).

The t r i a l

court ruled this tender to be timely and within the time allotted by the plaintiffs
in their notice of forfeiture. (R-53) The notice of forfeiture was obviously in e r r o r ,
having asked for the accelerated balance ($48, 535, 70 plus taxes and interest)
contrary to the provisions of the contract.

There were various letters back and

forth thereafter, Suburbia each time tendering payment of the delinquencies.
(Exhibits P-34, 35, 36).

Plaintiffs refused to acknowledge that Suburbia of Utah,

or Lester Romero, had anything to do with the agreement and proceeded with suit
against the Idaho corporation filed about November 4, 1970. (R-l)* It was not until
October, 1971, that the Nevada and Utah corporations, together with Lester R.
Romero were joined as defendants. (See plaintiffs' amended complaint filed
October 28, 1971).
Then on August 19, 1971, the plaintiffs completely reversed
themselves, repudiated the contract, (and, defendants believe, waived their notice
of default) by mailing a Notice to Quit to the defendants Maxfield, advising them
that the Modification Agreement was void and that they were considered tenants
at will and giving them five days to quit the premises. (P-46).
On December 1, 1971, defendants delivered to the escrow, the Bank
of Ephriam, a regular monthly payment for $400, which sum the bank accepted,
receipted, and posted to interest on December 1, 1971. (Exhibit D-18; Anderson
Tr. Bk. I, p. 53). It should be noted that the plaintiffs had never notified the escrow
of their notice of forfeiture,

It is the defendants' position that the acceptance of

this payment, after notice of default, effectively waived the default and the contract
must be re-instated, if indeed, it ever was in default
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After many motions and countermotions — After long and involved
p r e - t r i a l hearings, and after much pain and suffering on both sides, the trial
herein commenced in the Sanpete County Courthouse on April 22, 1974, before
the Honorable Maurice Harding, Judge pro-tem.

It is from the results of that

trial that defendants take this appeal.
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